Measuring China’s patent quality: development and validation of ISR indices by Boeing, Philipp & Müller, Elisabeth
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  P H I L I P P  B O E I N G  A N D 
E L I S A B E T H  M U E L L E R
/ /  N O . 1 9 - 0 1 7  |  0 5 / 2 0 1 9
Measuring China’s Patent  
Quality: Development and  
Validation of ISR Indices
Measuring China’s Patent Quality:  
Development and Validation of ISR Indices 
Philipp Boeing* and Elisabeth Mueller**
April 2019 
Because China has become one of the largest applicants of PCT patents, it is of interest to compare 
the quality of Chinese and non-Chinese applications. We extend a quality index based on 
internationally comparable citation data from international search reports (ISR) to consider foreign, 
domestic, and self citations. Whereas foreign citations show that Chinese PCT patent applications 
reach only a third of the non-Chinese quality benchmark, the extension towards domestic and self 
citations suggests a higher quality level that converges to or even surpasses the benchmark. We 
investigate these differences based on firm-level regressions and find that in China, only foreign 
citations, but not domestic and self citations, have a significant and positive relation to R&D stocks. 
Using Germany as a representative country without policy support for patenting, we show that all 
three citations types may be used as economic indicators if policy distortion is not a concern. Our 
results show that domestic and self citations suffer from an upward bias in China and should be 
employed with caution if they are to be interpreted as a measure of patent quality. 
Keywords: patent quality, cross-country comparison, China 
JEL classification: O34, O3 
* ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany and Peking
University, China Center for Economic Research (CCER), Beijing, China, Email: boeing@zew.de
** German Graduate School of Management and Law, Heilbronn, Germany and ZEW – Leibniz Centre
for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany, Email: elisabeth.mueller@ggs.de
Acknowledgements: We acknowledge valuable feedback from Loren Brandt, Can Huang, Xibao Li, Georg Licht, 
Xielin Liu, Alan Marco, Pierre Mohnen, Kazuyuki Motohashi, Russell Thomson, Beth Webster, Miaojie Yu and 
Xiaobo Zhang. We thank conference and seminar participants at the Academy of Management Conference 2016, 
ZEW Conference on Economics of Innovation and Patenting 2015, ZEW SEEK Conference 2015, OECD IP 
Statistics for Decision Makers 2015, Sino-German Workshop in Hangzhou 2015, APIC 2015, Peking University, 
Tsinghua University, Fudan University, Swinburne University of Technology, Zhejiang University, University 
Duisburg-Essen, Chinese Academy of Science, Chinese Academy of Social Science, and Chinese State 
Information Center for helpful discussion. We thank (former) patent examiners from China’s Patent Office, the 
European Patent Office, IP Australia, and the German Patent and Trademark Office as well as Carlo Pandolfi, 
Director International Co-operation at European Patent Office, for sharing their insights with us. Any errors 
remain those of the authors. 
2 
 
1. Introduction 
As the Chinese economy becomes increasingly innovation-driven, research and development 
(R&D) expenditures and patent applications have significantly increased. China’s ratio of 
gross expenditures for R&D to GDP has overtaken that of the European Union, and in gross 
R&D expenditure China is projected to overtake the USA around 2020 (OECD 2014). China 
is already leading in patent applications (World Bank 2016) and ranks second in applications 
made under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) (WIPO 2018). In recent years, China’s 
patent applications have risen disproportionately against its R&D expenditures, resulting in 
decreasing R&D inputs per patent.  
The Chinese government uses patent targets, subsidies, and other policy instruments to 
incentivize applications. The National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) targets 75 
thousand PCT patent applications in 2020, which would make China the leading PCT 
applicant country (WIPO 2018). It is well documented that patent subsidies are a driver of 
patent quantity in China (Chen and Zhang 2019, Dang and Motohashi 2015, Li 2012), and 
also support international and PCT applications. Additionally, there are other policy 
instruments, such as tax allowances, that increase the expected value of patenting for the 
applicant and may thereby incentivize more applications. 
Typically, patent applications are determined by R&D inputs and the expectation that 
the economic value of a patent exceeds its cost (Griliches 1990). Following the theoretical 
argument that a cost reduction, e.g. through subsidies, disproportionately incentivizes patents 
of marginal value (de Rassenfosse and Jaffee 2018), the increase in China’s patent quantity 
may have happened to the detriment of patent quality.  
The empirical assessment of China’s patent quality is challenging. One issue is that 
China’s patent office does not publicly disclose citation data that is widely used to measure 
patent quality (Harhoff et al. 1999). Moreover, even if citations were observable, further 
problems arise. Citation inflation through an increase in subsidy-induced, low quality patent 
applications may introduce an upward bias on this quality measure. To perform a 
comprehensive analysis of China’s patent quality we validate domestic citations in 
comparison to foreign ones, which are invariant to China’s economic policy, as economic 
indicators. International comparability of citation data is ensured by restricting the analysis to 
citations generated by international search reports (ISRs) in the PCT system.  
We extend the original ISR index (Boeing and Mueller 2016), which is based on 
foreign citations, by adding domestic and self citations. Whereas the use of foreign citations 
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shows that Chinese PCT patent applications reach only a third of the non-Chinese quality 
benchmark, the extension towards domestic and self citations suggests a higher quality level 
that converges to or even surpasses the international benchmark. We investigate these 
differences based on firm-level regressions and find that in China, only foreign citations, but 
not domestic and self citations, are a valid indicator of patent quality. Using Germany as a 
representative country without patent subsidies, we show that all three citations types may be 
used as economic indicators if policy distortion is not a concern. In conclusion, our results 
show that in China, domestic and self citations suffer from an upward bias and should be 
employed with caution if they are to be interpreted as a measure of patent quality. Our 
findings also support the argument by Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) that indicators fail 
as reliable measures if they become the target of policy. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we explain relevant 
details of the PCT system. In section 3 we discuss the properties of citation types and extend 
the ISR indices. In section 4 we describe our data and define our variables. In section 5 we 
show the descriptive analysis of patent quality and the present the validation of our indices. In 
section 6 we discuss our results and the wider applicability of the indices. Finally, section 7 
concludes. 
 
2. The PCT system 
The PCT system offers applicants international protection of inventions in up to 148 countries 
(WIPO 2015a). It is increasingly used by applicants worldwide, amassing a total of about 
214,500 PCT filings in 2014 (WIPO 2015a). As applicants choose only more valuable 
inventions for protection in numerous foreign countries, PCT applications are more 
homogeneous than a mixture of national and international applications.  
Applications are filed with a competent Receiving Office (RO), which is determined 
according to the home country of the applicant. For example, Chinese applicants must file 
PCT applications with the Chinese Patent Office (SIPO) as the RO. SIPO is also the only 
competent office to act as an International Search Authority (ISA). The designated ISAs 
publish the international search report (ISR) 18 months after the priority date. Globally, the 
search for prior art is highly concentrated: the top five ISAs were responsible for more than 
95% of ISRs in 2014 (European Patent Office (EPO) 38.8%, Japanese Patent Office (JPO) 
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20.0%, Korean Patent Office (KPO) 14.9%, SIPO 13.5%, USPTO 10.6% (WIPO 2015a, p. 
74f.)).1 
ISRs contain references to prior art. In the PCT system, applicants are encouraged to 
provide references to prior art. The description of the application should “indicate the 
background art which, as far as known to the applicant, can be regarded as useful for the 
understanding, searching and examination of the invention, and, preferably, cite the 
documents reflecting such art” (Rule 5 of WIPO 2016b).2 However, in the PCT system it is 
ultimately the examiner who determines which references are included in the ISR. Such 
selected references are an appropriate measure of patent quality as they constitute an 
evaluation by a third party – namely by the examiner – of the technical and legal relationships 
among patents. Furthermore, examiner citations show a much stronger correlation with patent 
value than applicant citations (Hegde and Sampat 2009). 
It is important to note that even though national patent offices act as ISAs, the 
examiners of the different offices follow the same strict examination rules from WIPO when 
drafting an ISR (WIPO 2016a). As we exclusively consider ISR citations, we rule out 
heterogeneity in national examination procedures and assure the comparability of citations.3 
The search guidelines explain in detail how citations are to be selected by the examiners 
(WIPO 2016a, §15.67-15.72). Examiners are encouraged to cite only the most relevant 
documents and, in the case that several members of one patent family are available, to cite 
documents in the language of the application (WIPO 2016a, §15.69). Due to the strict search 
rules defined by WIPO, the citation-bias of patent examiners against foreign prior art is 
adequately addressed. 
Against this regulatory background, Michel and Bettels (2001) report insights from 
actual examination practices and discuss the comparability of ISR citations for statistical 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
1 Note that applicants from the USA can file applications with numerous other offices than USPTO, e.g. EPO, 
JPO, and KPO. Thus, the number of searches for prior art at the respective ISAs is not directly indicative of the 
respective country’s level of PCT applications. 
2 The PCT rules strike a balance between the regulations of the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) and 
the European Patent Office (EPO). Whereas the USPTO requires applicants to provide references to all relevant 
prior art that they are aware of, the EPO requires only that examiners, and not applicants, carry out this task 
(Michel and Bettels 2001). 
3 The international phase ends 30 months after the priority date and applications enter the national phase in 
which national patent offices perform additional search and examination before making the grant decision. 
Citations in the national phase may differ from ISR citations as the former follow national guidelines. In order to 
restrict the citations to one institutional setting, we do not consider citations generated during the national phase 
for our quality indices. 
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analysis. They point out that the USPTO’s mean number of citations generated per domestic 
application is three times larger than the corresponding mean at the EPO. However, when 
these offices function as ISAs, the difference largely disappears and the authors recommend 
ISR citations generated within the PCT system for the purpose of cross-country comparisons. 
While one cannot rule out idiosyncratic deviations from WIPO’s regulations by individual 
examiners, there seems to be no indication of systematic deviation by individual ISAs. Having 
provided regulatory and empirical arguments favoring ISR citations generated via the PCT 
system for cross-country comparison, we next define how these citations are employed in ISR 
indices. 
 
3. Index definition 
The patent system provides several measures that have been used as quality indicators for 
patents. Among others, the number of references (backward citations), the existence of 
international applications, and the incidence of opposition filings have been used (Harhoff et 
al. 2003). It is generally accepted in the literature that forward citations provide the best 
approximation of patent quality (Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 2017, Gambardella et al. 2008, 
Reitzig 2004). That is, forward citations are a reflection of the technical value (Trajtenberg 
1990) and the economic value (Harhoff et al. 1999) of inventions. 
Using citations as an indicator of quality has shortcomings as the average citation 
counts vary by technology and by the priority year of the patent. The literature has advanced 
towards using normalized citation counts as suggested by Hall et al. (2001). The number of 
citations received by a given patent is divided by the average citation count of patents from 
the same technology and the same priority year. Thus, citation counts are made comparable. A 
limitation of this approach is that it is no longer possible to investigate how patent quality 
evolves over time. By construction, the average patent quality for each technology-priority 
cohort is equal to one. 
In a further step Boeing and Mueller (2016) introduce the ISR index as a quality 
measure that extends current best practice of using normalized citations in three respects. 
First, they choose a benchmark for normalization that does not rely upon the patents to be 
analyzed. For example, if the analysis group is patents from a specific country, then the 
normalization benchmark can be set by the average citations of patents from all other 
countries, excluding the country of interest. The index allows the flexibility to choose a 
comparison group that is a good fit for the intended analysis. Because patent quality is 
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measured relative to a comparison group, it is possible to measure quality changes over time. 
The index takes on a value of 100% if the quality level of the analysis group equals the 
quality level of the comparison group. Secondly, the index only uses citations generated by 
international search reports (ISRs) of PCT applications to achieve international comparability. 
Finally, the index is based only on citations produced by PCT applications from foreign 
countries (F citations), i.e. excluding PCT applications from the analysis group. This 
restriction ensures that citations are independent of the economic policy of the country whose 
patents are in the analysis group. 
We extend the quality index from Boeing and Mueller (2016) by considering domestic 
citations (D citations), i.e. citations from patents of the country of the applicant, and self 
citations (S citations), i.e. citations from earlier patents of the applicant itself. Whereas 
invariance with respect to national policy can be an advantage of a quality index, the inclusion 
of domestic and self citations may provide a more comprehensive and better understanding of 
patent quality. In the following discussion, we lay out specific characteristics of foreign, 
domestic, and self citations and define the extended ISR quality indices. 
Generally, foreign citations are understood as a measure of high quality because they 
indicate the international competitiveness of domestic inventions. Firms build on prior art 
from third countries given that the cited inventions are closer to the global technology frontier 
than inventions from their own country. In addition, a high share of foreign citations on 
domestic science shows that foreign firms seek to appropriate the results of domestic R&D 
(Tijssen 2001).  
In contrast to international competitiveness proxied by foreign citations, domestic 
citations are rather a measure of an economy’s technological self-reliance. Stronger reliance 
on domestic prior art may correspond to a higher level of development as there is less 
dependence on research conducted abroad. For example, Kang et al. (2014) study the Chinese 
and Korean telecommunication industry and find that, over time, firms increasingly cite prior 
art from their own country for standard-essential patents. As the diffusion of knowledge 
correlates negatively with geographical distance, it is useful to distinguish foreign and 
domestic citations because domestic citations are received earlier (Narin 1994, Jaffe et al. 
1993, Jaffe and Trajtenberg 1999).  
While foreign and domestic citations differ across international and national 
provenance of follow-up inventions, self citations examine follow-up inventions within 
organizations. Empirical studies tend to find that self citations are more valuable to firms than 
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non-self citations (e.g., Hall et al. 2005, Deng 2008). Firms with more self citations are able to 
appropriate returns from earlier investment in R&D and signal the presence of “cumulative 
innovations” (Lanjouw and Schankerman 2004). Self citations may also be an indicator of 
“fencing” – which is prevalent when firms build an “IPR wall” around themselves (Belderbos 
and Somers 2015). Because foreign, domestic, and self citations characterize different origins 
of follow-up inventions, a more nuanced understanding of patent quality can be achieved by 
considering information from all three citation types.  
3.1 Calculation of ISR indices 
In the remainder of this section we define the extended ISR indices based on foreign, 
domestic, and self citations. To correctly apply the index, one must define two sets of patents: 
the analysis group and the comparison group. For example, if the quality of PCT applications 
of a specific country is to be analyzed, it is natural to choose the PCT applications from all 
other countries as comparison group. In this situation the indices reflect the relative 
positioning of the analysis country to the rest of the world. 
The ISR indices are first calculated at the year-technology level. The information 
content of the indices increases monotonically by index type, first relying only on F citations, 
then also including D and S citations. The ISR index is defined at the level of year t and 
technology k as follows: 
(1)                        𝐼𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑡,𝑘) =  
1
𝑁𝑡,𝑘
1
𝑀𝑡,𝑘
∑ 𝐼𝑆𝑅 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑖
𝑁𝑡,𝑘
𝑖=1
∑ 𝐼𝑆𝑅 𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑗
𝑀𝑡,𝑘
𝑖=1
 
Nt,k is the number of patents in the analysis group. Mt,k is the number of patents in the 
comparison group. ISR citationsi is the number of ISR citations received by patent i within the 
specified time window, e.g. 3 or 5 years. 
In order to obtain the quality indices at the desired level of aggregation (e.g. country-, 
industry-, or firm-level), one has to multiply the year and technology specific indices with the 
number of applications per year and technology (Nt,k), sum over the products, and then divide 
by the number of patents in the aggregate (N). 4  Index values of above (below) 100% 
correspond to average patent quality above (below) the quality level of the comparison group. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
4 If a patent is allocated to more than one technology class, one has to apply fractional counting. 
8 
 
(2)                        𝐼𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =  
1
𝑁
∑ ∑ 𝑁𝑡,𝑘 ∗ 𝐼𝑆𝑅 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥(𝑡,𝑘)
𝐾
𝑘=1
𝑇
𝑡=1
 
We define three distinct ISR indices for patent quality. The F index is the original 
index as established by Boeing and Mueller (2016). It only considers non-self citations 
received by foreign countries, i.e. from countries other than the applicant country (F 
citations). The quality measurement of this index is exogenous with respect to domestic 
economic policy. In addition to F citations, the extended FD index also accounts for non-self 
citations of domestic origin (D citations). The measurement of this index is exogenous with 
respect to the patenting strategy of the applicant. The FDS index is the most comprehensive 
index as it also takes self citations (S citations) into account. There is a tradeoff between 
relying on more “neutral” sources of information and being more inclusive. 
 
4. Variable definition and data 
4.1 Index definition for China 
In our application of the index we choose PCT applications from China as analysis group and 
non-Chinese PCT applications as comparison group. Our indices provide information on 
whether the strong increase in China’s patent quantity influenced the average patent quality. 
The comparison of Chinese PCT applications to the non-Chinese benchmark allows for an 
assessment of the average quality of Chinese PCT applications relative to the rest of the 
world. We choose a time period of 3 years as our citation window, and we define technologies 
at the 3-digit level of the IPC classification. 
4.2 Data sources 
Beginning with China’s patent expansion in 2001, we observe all PCT applications with 
priority years between 2001 and 2009 using the EPO Worldwide Patent Statistical Database 
(PATSTAT Version April 2013). During the priority year, the applicant can file applications 
for the same invention at additional patent offices. Applications are allocated to countries 
according to the address of the first applicant. We only consider citations from distinct pairs 
of citing and cited patent families and identify self citations based on DOCDB standard names 
from PATSTAT and the EEE-PPAT applicant name harmonization (Magerman et al. 2006). 
To categorize patents according to technology, we use the 3-digit technology class level of the 
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IPC classification and apply fractional counting to apportion patents that belong to more than 
one technology class. Given the typical trade-off between precision and timeliness 
characteristic of work with patent citations, we restrict the citation window to a still 
informative three years to capture more recent dynamics.  
To validate ISR indices, we calculate these indices at the firm level and evaluate them 
against firm characteristics. Our Chinese firm-level data consists of all firms listed at the stock 
exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen between 2001 and 2009.5 Due to government stock 
issuance quotas, the sample mainly includes domestic large- and medium-sized firms from 
manufacturing industries and the coastal region, whereas other industries and inland regions 
are represented to a lesser extent. 6  The balance sheet information is compiled from 
DATASTREAM and the Chinese databases CSMAR, RESSET, and WIND. As the coverage 
of R&D expenditures in these databases is rather incomplete before 2007, supplementary 
information on reported R&D expenditures has been collected from the universe of annual 
reports accessible via the Chinese CNINFO database.  
In addition to R&D information, we also observe a firm’s number of employees, age, 
ownership, industry affiliation, and the provincial GDP per capita. All variables in monetary 
values have been deflated using China’s GDP deflator from the World Bank. Finally, we 
merge patent data with the firm panel data following the procedure detailed in Boeing et al. 
(2016).  
4.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for firm-year observations with above zero PCT 
applications. We calculate the average index over all PCT applications filed by a firm in a 
given year. The F index, FD index, and FDS index have a mean of 43.3%, 76.4%, and 87.5%, 
respectively. Employing the perpetual investment method, we follow the standard in the 
literature and compute the R&D stock assuming a 5% annual growth rate of R&D and an 
annual depreciation rate of 15% (Hall et al. 2010). The R&D stock has a mean of 488 million 
RMB and a median of 30.4 million RMB.7 The PCT intensity is calculated as the application 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
5 Data for listed firms is commonly used to investigate the innovation performance of firms, e.g. see Autor et al. 
(2017) for the US; Aghion et al. (2005) for Europe; and Fang et al. (2018) for China. 
6 Only domestic firms are listed on the A-share board of the stock exchanges of Shanghai and Shenzhen. 
According to the definition of the China Securities Regulatory Commission, a firm is considered domestic if the 
percentage of total shares held by foreign parties does not exceed 20%. 
7 In the regression analysis we will take the log of the R&D stock + 1 RMB, because some observations have 
zero R&D. 
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stock depreciated by an annual rate of 15% and scaled by thousand employees. This variable 
proxies the accumulated experience in international patenting. PCT applicants are relatively 
large and rather young: the median of employees is 3126 and the median age is 11 years. To 
reflect China’s economic reforms, we broadly differentiate between firms with and without 
state ownership and find that, according to this distinction, 41.7% of observations are from 
private firms. We account for regional heterogeneity in China’s economic development by 
GDP per capita at the provincial level. Table A1 in the appendix shows pairwise correlations 
of the variables. 
Table 1: Firm characteristics 
Variable Mean Median S.D. Min. Max. Obs. 
F index 43.3 0 135.2 0 1350.4 451 
FD index 76.4 0 154.2 0 923.7 451 
FDS index 87.5 0 139.4 0 890.4 451 
R&D stock (million RMB) 487.9 30.4 2183.6 0 25001 451 
PCT intensity 3.443 0.825 8.443 0.005 100 451 
Employees 20237 3126 68680 10 539168 451 
Age 11.5 11 5.1 1 29 451 
Private ownership 0.417 0 0.494 0 1 451 
Provincial GDP per capita (RMB) 30996 29447 15786 5905 66006 451 
Note: Statistics based on firms with at least one PCT application. ISR indices are calculated as averages of 
annual patent applications and are expressed as percentages. Observations are at the firm-year level. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
The Chinese government relies on patent targets and policy instruments to incentivize 
applications. In 2020, the National Patent Development Strategy (2011-2020) targets 75 
thousand PCT patents applications, which would make China the world leading country in 
PCT applications. It is well documented that patent subsidies have contributed to the increase 
in patent quantity (Chen and Zhang 2019, Dang and Motohashi 2015, Li 2012), and there are 
also subsidies to support international and PCT applications. 8  In addition, other policy 
instruments, such as tax allowances, may indirectly change the cost or value of patenting and 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
8 Most programs reimburse application fees and additionally award granted patents. Subsidies for international 
applications are typically larger (Li 2012). In 2009 the Ministry of Finance launched a program that explicitly 
supports PCT patents. Applications in up to five countries are subsidized with a maximum of 100,000 RMB each 
(ca. 14,600 USD, exchange rate of 31.12.2009) but more support is possible for projects involving significant 
innovation. Subsidies mainly cover fees for patent agents, examination and renewal. Song et al. (2016) calculates 
that in ten provinces the amount of subsidies even exceed actual fees once common rebates are taken into 
account, which makes filing applications profitable regardless of the patent’s expected economic value. 
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thereby contribute to more applications.9 Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) point out that 
indicators may fail as reliable measures if they become the target of policy. Along these lines 
it is meaningful that patent applications have risen faster than R&D expenditures in recent 
years (Figure A1), resulting in decreasing R&D inputs per patent (Figure A2).  
Our concern is that China may experience a “citation inflation” (Marco 2007). Given 
that a patent is applied for if the expected value exceeds the cost of patenting, a cost 
reduction, e.g. through subsidies, disproportionately incentivizes marginal, low-quality 
patents (Griliches 1990, de Rassenfosse and Jaffee 2018). Hence, China’s policy not only 
increases the quantity of patents but simultaneously incentivizes applications of lower quality. 
A citation inflation would compromise the validity of Chinese citations as an economic 
indicator of patent quality. If more patents are filed that can cite existing prior art and if the 
average value of the citing patents declines, then the explanatory power of citations as quality 
indicators is weakened. Hence, Chinese D and S citations generated by policy-induced low-
quality applications might fail as reliable measures of patent quality and introduce an upward 
bias of the FD and FDS indices. In contrast, the non-Chinese F citations and the F index are 
independent from China’s economic policy and not subject to this bias. In section 5.1 we 
provide a descriptive analysis of the ISR indices. In section 5.2 we use regression analysis to 
test the validity of citations and indices. Section 5.3 reports several robustness tests. 
5.1 Descriptive analysis of patent quality 
The differences between the F, FD, and FDS indices are striking (Table 2). With a mean of 
32.1%, the F index shows that China’s PCT patent quality is significantly below that of the 
non-Chinese comparison group, which consists mainly of high-income countries.10 Over time 
this mean declines from 44.9% to 30.4%. In contrast, the means of the FD (61.6%) and FDS 
(90.0%) indices show that China’s quality level is approaching that of the comparison group 
and over time converges to or even surpasses it. A key insight is that, in global comparison, 
Chinese firms rely disproportionately on domestic and internal technologies. The rising focus 
on domestic prior art corresponds to a decoupling from the international innovation system, 
while the rise in self citations may be a reflection of firms working in silos. Overall, we find 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
9 One example is the High New Technology Enterprise (HNTE) Program, which lists patents in force as an 
eligibility criterion (Garcia et al. 2016). Because the program offers a tax reduction for accredited firms, the 
expected value of patenting increases for HNTE applicants. 
10 In 2013, 87% of PCT applications came from high-income countries, 12% from upper-middle-income 
countries (thereof 10% from China) and only 1% from lower-middle-income countries (WIPO 2015b). 
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that the three indices offer different conclusions regarding the quality level and the quality 
evolution of Chinese patents.  
Table 2. Quality of Chinese PCT patent applications 
 
F 
index 
FD  
index 
FDS 
index 
PCT patent 
applications 
2001 44.9 37.3 36.3 793 
2002 34.2 32.0 30.1 1060 
2003 38.8 35.3 31.8 1368 
2004 34.4 27.7 32.0 1948 
2005 41.0 38.8 44.5 3321 
2006 30.7 42.4 51.5 4649 
2007 29.0 55.3 72.6 5799 
2008 29.8 76.3 112.0 6159 
2009 30.4 89.1 151.8 9641 
Total 32.1 61.6 90.0 34738 
Note: Mean values for F index, FD index, and FDS index displayed as percentages. The first column is a 
replication from Boeing and Mueller (2016). Observations are at the patent level. 
 
The variation of indices across six technology areas is displayed in Figure A3. Patents 
in the field of electrical engineering, which constitute the majority with 57% of China’s PCT 
applications, also exhibit the largest difference between the F index (27.5%) and the FDS 
index (97.6%). The dominance of electrical engineering is related to ZTE and Huawei, two 
globally operating ICT firms that together file one third of Chinese PCT applications. 
Additional analysis shows that both firms receive fewer foreign citations than the average 
Chinese applicant but, consistent with their large size, exhibit considerably more self 
citations. Applications in the second largest field, chemistry, display the smallest difference 
between the F index (38.4%) and the FDS index (49.3%). This variation is in consistent with 
the typical citation behavior in complex vs. discrete technologies. The differences in the 
remaining technology areas – mechanical engineering, consumer goods and construction, 
instruments, and process engineering – fall somewhere in the middle. 
Because variation in the indices is not only determined by Chinese patents, but also by 
the non-Chinese comparison group, we investigate average citations for both groups 
separately in Table 3. We find that the decline of the F index over time is a result of the 
decrease in the average number of citations obtained by Chinese PCT applications relative to 
the stable number obtained by the comparison group. Similarly, the increases of the FD and 
FDS indices are due to increases in the average citations obtained by Chinese PCT 
applications, whereas the average citations obtained by the non-Chinese comparison group are 
stable over time. We are not aware of any large-scale policy programs outside of China that 
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may inflate the benchmark during our observation period. Hence, variation in the indices is 
mainly a reflection of Chinese dynamics against non-Chinese stability. 
Table 3: Average citations for Chinese and non-Chinese PCT patent applications 
 Average citations  
 
F  
citations 
 F and D  
citations 
 F, D, and S 
citations 
 
CN 
patents 
Non-CN 
patents 
 CN 
patents 
Non-CN 
patents 
 CN 
patents 
Non-CN 
patents 
2001 0.131 0.276  0.165 0.424  0.217 0.587 
2002 0.079 0.249  0.108 0.371  0.144 0.528 
2003 0.085 0.241  0.112 0.348  0.148 0.499 
2004 0.074 0.224  0.088 0.317  0.143 0.448 
2005 0.091 0.230  0.126 0.323  0.199 0.442 
2006 0.074 0.258  0.154 0.364  0.262 0.495 
2007 0.075 0.292  0.235 0.414  0.407 0.545 
2008 0.077 0.302  0.311 0.431  0.627 0.580 
2009 0.076 0.292  0.325 0.426  0.781 0.576 
Total 0.079 0.276  0.234 0.396  0.473 0.536 
Note: Non-Chinese patents weighted according to the technology distribution of China. The values of “Chinese 
patents” and “non-Chinese patents” are the numerator and denominator values of the indices respectively. 
Observations are at the patent level. 
 
Our descriptive analysis shows that using different quality indices may lead to 
opposing conclusions regarding the level and development of the quality of Chinese PCT 
applications. These results demonstrate the importance of evaluating patent quality based on a 
valid indicator. While F citations are superior in their invariance with respect to national 
policy, the probability of obtaining F citations may decrease in a country’s share in global 
PCT applications. However, the exclusion of domestic citations penalizes China less than 
other countries. 11,12 Analysis of the index components corroborates that increases in the FD 
and FDS indices are driven by D and S citations from China’s rapidly rising PCT applications. 
An important distinction to make is whether domestic citations are inflated by policy-induced 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
11 To account for the inverse effect of China’s rising share of global PCT applications on China’s citation 
probability, we divide the F index by China’s share of global PCT applications in a given year. The values of the 
F index change only marginally, e.g. to 45.8 in 2001 and 32.0 in 2009. Note that a country’s increasing share of 
global PCT applications does not mechanically induce a downward trend of the F index for that country. For 
example, the Republic of Korea’s global share of PCT applications has increased from 2% in 2001 to 6% in 
2009 and its F index increased from 74.4 to 80.4 (Boeing and Mueller 2016). In the meantime, China’s share 
(2% in 2001 and 5% in 2009) remained far below the share of other leading PCT countries, e.g. the US (40% in 
2001 and 29% in 2009). 
12 Quantifying the effect of language bias, Boeing and Mueller (2016) show that China’s average ISR index 
based on F citations increases only modestly from 32.1% to 35.6% after taking the bias into account. As core 
elements of PCT applications are published in English – i.e. abstract, title, search report, and text of drawings – 
negative bias that results from Chinese-only language elements is negligible.  
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low quality patents, or whether they adequately reflect China’s rising innovation capacity. In 
the following subsection we therefore validate different citation types as indicators of patent 
quality. 
 
5.2 Index validation 
Following the simple model by Griliches (1990), a patent application is stochastically 
determined by the amount of R&D devoted to the respective research project and the 
expectation that the economic value of patenting exceeds the cost of patenting. Given that the 
patent premium remains stable and that the level of current and past R&D expenditures, i.e. 
the R&D stock, increases the technological success of research projects, an increase in the 
number of patents is understood as an increase in economically valuable knowledge. The 
production of knowledge ?̇? depends on R&D  (?̇? = 𝑅 + 𝑢), and the patent count 𝑃 depends 
on ?̇? (𝑃 = 𝑎?̇? + 𝑣), where the random components 𝑢 and 𝑣 are independent of each other. 
Hence, the validity of 𝑃 as an indicator of ?̇? depends on the relative magnitude of 𝑣. Once 𝑅 
is used as a substitute of unobserved ?̇? (𝑃 = 𝑎𝑅 + 𝑎𝑢 + 𝑣), the relationship between 𝑃 and 𝑅 
provides a lower bound of the validity of 𝑃 as an indicator of ?̇?. 
Let 𝑃𝑖𝑡 denote a patent indicator of firm 𝑖 in year 𝑡, which is assumed to depend on 
firm-specific variables in 𝑋𝑖𝑡, the log of the R&D stock 𝑟𝑖𝑡, industry fixed effects 𝜙𝑗 and year 
fixed effects 𝜏𝑡 in the following way:  
(3)                                       𝑃𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝑋𝑖𝑡𝛽 + 𝛾𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜙𝑗 + 𝜏𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 
In this setting, a significant 𝛾 would reject the null hypothesis that 𝑃𝑖𝑡 is not a valid 
measure for economically valuable knowledge. The vector of characteristics 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the 
PCT stock scaled by employees to proxy the accumulated experience in international 
patenting, the log number of employees to control for firm size effects, the log of firm age, 
and a dummy to control for private ownership. Furthermore, we account for heterogeneity in 
the economic development across provinces by the log of provincial GDP per capita.   
The literature often estimates models similar to equation (3), where 𝑃𝑖𝑡  either is a 
patent count (Pakes and Griliches 1984), a citation-weighted patent count (Aghion et al. 
2013), a normalized citation count (Hall et al. 2001), or average citations per patent (Bessen 
2008, Blind et al. 2009). While the number of patents is associated with the magnitude of 
research effort, citation-weighted patent count combines the scale of effort with a measure of 
success (Jaffe and de Rassenfosse 2017). The measure of citation-weighted patent count is 
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defined as patents multiplied by the raw number of citations received. The measure 
normalized citation count is a refinement of raw citation counts, as it uses citations that are 
normalized to eliminate technology and year differences. Studies with focus on China are up 
to now only available for 𝑃𝑖𝑡  as a simple patent count. They tend to find a patent-R&D 
elasticity that is considerably lower as compared to OECD countries (Chen and Zhang 2019, 
Hu et al. 2017, Hu and Jefferson 2009).  
In Table 4 we estimate equation (3) with the ISR indices as the dependent variable. 
We use a Tobit model because there is censoring from below at zero as the latent variable 
citations is only observed when patents are above zero but remains unobserved otherwise. We 
start with the F index in column (1) and find that 𝛾 is positive and highly significant. We 
transform the coefficient of 0.166 into a marginal effect of 0.034 to derive an intuitive 
interpretation of the size of the effect. The Tobit model has the structure of a linear-log model, 
i.e. the dependent variable is in linear form and the regressor of interest, the R&D stock, is in 
logarithms. Because an increase of the R&D stock by 1% corresponds to an increase in the 
log of the R&D stock by 0.01, we multiply the marginal effect of 0.034 by 0.01 to arrive at 
the unit change in the index that is caused by a 1% increase in the R&D stock. Thus, we find 
that a 1% increase in the R&D stock corresponds to an increase in the quality index by 
0.00034, or by 0.034 percentage points. When interpreted relative to the mean of the F index 
(0.433 or 43.3%), a 1% increase in R&D stock leads to an increase in patent quality of about 
0.1%. This result confirms a positive and economically important relationship between the 
R&D stock and patent quality.  
Moving on to the interpretation of the control variables, we find a positive and highly 
significant impact for PCT intensity. Patent quality shows a positive relationship with a firm’s 
experience in filing international patents.  
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Table 4: Tobit model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
F 
index 
FD 
index 
FDS 
index 
D 
index 
S 
index 
R&D stock (log) 0.166*** 0.036 -0.005 -0.090 -0.120 
 (0.061) (0.034) (0.026) (0.115) (0.077) 
PCT intensity 0.141*** 0.060* 0.039** 0.141 0.144*** 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.017) (0.094) (0.042) 
Employees (log) 0.298 0.215 0.217** 0.875* 1.126*** 
 (0.222) (0.144) (0.095) (0.509) (0.336) 
Age (log) -0.951 -0.165 -0.038 0.427 0.067 
 (0.671) (0.439) (0.292) (1.636) (0.928) 
Private ownership (0/1) 0.641 -0.128 -0.061 -0.898 -0.062 
 (0.674) (0.441) (0.292) (1.442) (0.996) 
Provincial GDP per capita (log) -0.486 -0.223 -0.407 -0.212 -1.298 
 (0.629) (0.456) (0.340) (1.457) (1.105) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations  451  451  451  451  451  
Log pseudo likelihood -350.75 -545.66 -608.07 -485.34 -491.37 
Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. Standard errors are clustered at the firm-level. ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
In column (2) the dependent variable is the FD index and  𝛾 becomes substantially 
smaller and insignificant. In column (3) with the FDS index as the dependent variable 𝛾 is 
close to zero and insignificant. With the addition of self citations to the index we find a 
positive and significant coefficient for firm size. This is to be expected as larger firms have 
more prior art they can cite. In columns (4) and (5) we restrict the index to D and S citations, 
respectively, and neither index has a significant relationship with R&D stock. For self 
citations we again confirm a positive and highly significant correlation with firm size. The 
main result is that only F citations, but not D or S citations, provide a valid measure of patent 
quality.13  
5.3 Robustness tests 
In this section we challenge our main results in several robustness tests. First, in Table 5 we 
report results for a Heckman selection model that allows firms to select to be PCT applicants. 
The model fits the two independent processes of filing patents and receiving citations. The 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
13 Our results for the validation of the different citation types do not hinge on the use of average patent quality as 
dependent variable. We also computed the outcome variable 𝑃𝑖𝑡  based on citation-weighted patent counts and 
normalized citation counts. The results remain very similar when we re-estimate the regressions presented in 
Table 4 based on the alternative dependent variables.  
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proper specification requires an exclusion restriction that explains selection but is no 
explanatory factor in the outcome equation. We use the number of employees relative to the 
industry mean as an exclusion restriction, following the rationale that relatively larger firms 
are more likely to file PCT applications, whereas relative firm size is no determinant for 
average patent quality. The positive and at the 1%-level significant coefficient of the 
exclusion restriction supports this rationale (column 1).14  
The outcome equations for patent quality show only a significant influence of the 
R&D stock for the F index (column 2) but not for the indices that include D and S citations 
(columns 3-6). Our main results are therefore confirmed by the selection model. The positive 
values of rho and the inverse mills ratio (IMR) confirm a positive correlation of the error 
terms in the selection and outcome equations. Under the assumption of a correctly specified 
model, the null hypothesis of no selection bias can be tested with a t-test on the IMR 
(Wooldridge 2010, p.806). The insignificance of the IMR suggests that unobservable firm 
characteristics are unlikely to induce selection bias.  
Table 5: Heckman two-step selection model 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
PCT application 
(0/1) 
F  
index 
FD  
index 
FDS  
index 
D  
index 
S  
index 
 1st stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 2nd stage 
Relative firm size 
0.007*** 
(0.001) 
     
R&D stock (log) 
0.023*** 
(0.004) 
0.034*** 
(0.013) 
0.020 
(0.014) 
0.005 
(0.013) 
-0.004 
(0.032) 
-0.018 
(0.023) 
IMR  
0.318 
(0.390) 
0.547 
(0.448) 
0.500 
(0.392) 
1.091 
(0.992) 
0.231 
(0.711) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Rho  0.237 0.348  0.363 0.315 0.095 
Observations 12575 451 451 451 451 451 
Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the stock of PCT applications by thousand employees, the 
log of employees, the log of age, a dummy for private ownership, and the log of provincial GDP per capita. IRM 
is the inverse mills ratio. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
 
 
 
14 The selection equation also shows a positive and highly significant effect of the R&D stock on the probability 
of filing at least one PCT application. Filing PCT applications is also more likely for private-ownership and 
firms in provinces with a higher GDP per capita. Note that we omit the regressor PCT intensity in the first stage 
because of high correlation with the probability of having at least one PCT application. 
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We perform additional specification tests because several studies have shown that the 
result of Heckman models can be sensitive to misspecification (e.g. Lennox et al. 2012 and 
Certo et al. 2016). First, we calculate the correlation of the IMR with the other regressors of 
the outcome equation. High multicollinearity implies that the IMR does not contain 
substantial information that is not already included in the other regressors. In such a situation, 
an insignificant IMR would not reliably indicate the absence of selection bias. With an 
average correlation of 0.295 we can reject this concern. This result together with the highly 
significant exclusion restriction in the selection equation suggests that the exclusion 
restriction is strong enough to detect selection bias if present. Second, we lag the exclusion 
restriction “relative size” by one period to test robustness with respect to changes in the 
restriction. The results for R&D stock in the outcome equations remain almost identical and 
the exclusion restriction remains significant at 1%. Third, we investigate whether the results 
of the outcome equation change when selection is not controlled for. If an insignificant IMR 
is the result of model misspecification, then results with and without selection correction can 
still diverge. For the Heckman selection model, we obtain a marginal effect for the R&D 
stock of 0.034 in column (2), which is in fact identical to the marginal effect in the Tobit 
model. Overall, we find that our results are not compromised by possible selection bias. 
In a second robustness test, reported in Table 6, we exploit the panel properties of our 
data for identification. Because of inconsistency of the Tobit fixed effects estimator, Cameron 
and Trivedi (2005, p.800) recommend a random effects Tobit model with the Chamberlain-
Mundlak device. This estimator achieves consistent results even if the time-invariant error 
term is not independent from the time-variant regressors. For additional controls, the 
regression specification includes the average value of time-variant regressors, ?̅?. Again, the 
size of 𝛾 declines as we extend the indices from F to FD to FDS and the significance levels 
decline from 5%, to marginally significant at 10%, to insignificant. For indices only based on 
D or S citations 𝛾 remains insignificant. 
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Table 6: RE Tobit model with Chamberlain-Mundlak device 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
F 
index 
FD 
index 
FDS 
index 
D 
index 
S 
index 
R&D stock (log) 
0.163** 
(0.074) 
0.108* 
(0.056) 
0.042 
(0.037) 
0.080 
(0.185) 
-0.171 
(0.123) 
𝑋𝑖𝑡  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Chamberlain-Mundlak device: 𝑋?̅? Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 451 451 451 451 451 
Log likelihood -345.61 -537.28 -596.32 -473.04 -476.77 
Note: Analysis is at the firm-year level. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 includes the stock of PCT applications by thousand employees, the 
log of employees, the log of age, a dummy for private ownership, and the log of provincial GDP per capita. 
Bootstrapped standard errors with 50 repetitions. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
 
Third, we exclude the largest PCT applicant, ZTE, and re-estimate Table 4. The 
significance levels remain unchanged and the marginal effect in column (1) is very similar 
(results not reported). Thus, we could confirm that the results are not dominated by a single 
PCT champion.  
So far we have argued that the validity of D and S citations may suffer from a subsidy-
induced inflation of low quality patents and citations in China. Therefore, in our final 
robustness test we aim to scrutinize the validity of indices in a context without subsidies. 
While we cannot identify the before-and-after subsidy setting in China, we can turn to 
Germany as a country without patent subsidies. The German firm-level data comes from the 
Mannheim Innovation Panel (MIP) and includes about 3000 firms. Table A3 shows the ISR 
indices based on PCT applications filed by the German firms between 2001 and 2009. While 
the averages between indices increase monotonically from the F to FD and FDS index, the 
averages within indices remain rather stable over time. Assuming that the FDS index is 
unbiased in the German setting, the results suggest that Germany’s patent quality narrowly 
oscillates around the non-German comparison group.  
We estimate equation (3) based on the German firm-level data. Because the 
relationship between R&D and patent quality may differ between industries, we weight the 
observations according to the Chinese industry composition to make results more comparable 
across countries. Table 7 replicates the main estimations reported in Table 4. Parameter 𝛾 is 
positive and significant in all six columns. When we interpret the marginal effects relative to 
the mean of the indices, we find that a 1% increase in the R&D stock corresponds to an 
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increase in patent quality of 0.1% for the F index, the same magnitude as for Chinese firms. 
Thus, the F index, which is exogenous to economic policy, gives the same result in both 
countries. In a context without subsidies, we find that all three citation types are valid 
measures for patent quality. 
Table 7: Tobit model for German firms 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
F 
index 
FD 
index 
FDS 
index 
D 
index 
S 
index 
R&D stock (log)  0.279*** 0.182*** 0.160*** 0.532** 0.401*** 
 (0.071) (0.047) (0.036) (0.223) (0.102) 
PCT intensity 0.021*** 0.014*** 0.011*** 0.096*** 0.044*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.018) (0.005) 
Employees (log)  0.174 0.104 0.058 1.323*** 0.547*** 
 (0.116) (0.082) (0.059) (0.404) (0.138) 
Age (log) -0.150 -0.147 -0.161* -0.150 -0.571** 
 (0.169) (0.120) (0.091) (0.555) (0.223) 
Eastern Germany (0/1) -1.689*** -1.358*** -0.995*** -3.066 -1.060 
 (0.548) (0.419) (0.294) (1.983) (0.733) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1844 1844  1844  1844  1844  
Log pseudo likelihood -2423.46 -2648.96 -2737.52 -2360.49 -2330.26 
Note: Analysis is at firm-year level. Standard errors clustered at the firm-level. Observations are weighted 
according to the Chinese industry composition. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels. 
 
6. Discussion 
China’s increase in patent quantity is partially driven by application targets, patent subsidies, 
and other policy instruments. An important question is whether citations have been inflated by 
policy-induced, low quality patents or provide an adequate reflection of China’s rising 
innovation capacity. Based on our analysis we fail to confirm that Chinese D and S citations 
are a valid measure for economically valuable knowledge. In contrast, non-Chinese F 
citations, which are independent from China’s economic policy, provide a valid indicator. We 
replicate the analysis in a context without subsidies and the significance of all indices shows 
that, when policy distortion is not a concern, all citations types are valid measures. Our 
findings support the argument by Goodhart (1975) and Lucas (1976) that indicators fail as 
reliable measures if they become the target of policy. In contrast to the F index, the FD and 
FDS indices are upward biased in China.  
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More generally, in settings without policy distortion all three ISR indices can be used 
to maximize the information content provided by forward citations. Beyond the analysis of 
PCT patents, ISR citations may be used to measure the quality of national patents because 
prior art search for PCT applications is not restricted to previous PCT applications, but rather 
it encompasses the patent literature from a large number of patent offices. The indices are 
versatile in their application as they can be used to analyze patent quality at various levels, 
e.g. at the country, industry, or firm level. 
In future research it would be of interest to investigate for Chinese firms whether the 
quality of patent applications is related to measures of firm performance, such as total factor 
productivity or profitability.  
 
7. Conclusion 
In recent years China’s patent applications have risen faster than R&D expenditures, resulting 
in decreasing R&D inputs per patent. Given that this patent expansion is policy-driven, we 
validate domestic citations in comparison to foreign ones, which are invariant to China’s 
policy, as economic indicators. We derive internationally comparable citation data from ISRs 
and use foreign, domestic, and self citations to perform a comprehensive analysis of patent 
quality.  
Whereas foreign citations show that Chinese PCT patent applications reach only a 
third of the non-Chinese quality benchmark, the extension towards domestic and self citations 
suggests an increasing quality level that is closer to the international benchmark. The rising 
focus on domestic prior art corresponds to a decoupling from the international innovation 
system, while the rise in self citations emphasized a focus on prior art from within the 
organization. However, the differences among indices can also be the result of a policy-driven 
citation inflation. We investigate these differences based on firm-level regressions and find 
that only foreign citations, but not domestic and self citations, are a valid indicator of patent 
quality. Using Germany as a representative country without patent subsidies, we show that all 
three citations types may be used as an economic indicator if policy distortion is not a 
concern. Our results emphasize that Chinese citations suffer from an upward bias and should 
be employed with caution if they are to be interpreted as a measure of patent quality. 
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Appendix: Tables and Figures 
 
Table A1: Pairwise correlations of Chinese firm characteristics 
 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. F index         
2. FD index 0.552        
3. FDS index 0.425 0.753       
4. R&D stock (log) 0.045 0.067 0.094      
5. PCT intensity 0.049 0.022 0.043 -0.105     
6. Employees (log) -0.033 0.010 0.035 0.235 -0.413    
7. Age (log) -0.099 -0.014 0.055 0.105 0.054 -0.083   
8. Private ownership (0/1) -0.007 -0.008 0.050 -0.000 -0.046 -0.042 0.263  
9. Provincial GDP per capita (log) -0.072 0.020 0.024 0.131 0.100 0.130 0.063 0.025 
Note: Statistics based on firms with at least one PCT application. ISR indices are calculated as averages of 
annual patent applications. Observations are at the firm-year level. 
 
 
Table A2: ISR indices for Chinese firms 
 
F 
index 
FD 
index 
FDS 
index 
Obs. 
2001 60.3 85.3 94.2 53 
2002 56.6 56.5 68.3 102 
2003 42.6 53.0 48.5 159 
2004 81.7 78.1 68.0 195 
2005 56.0 69.9 56.0 347 
2006 55.7 61.0 65.2 429 
2007 46.7 74.1 102.4 710 
2008 23.1 62.4 144.7 871 
2009 18.7 61.4 152.5 2318 
Total 33.1 64.4 122.0 5184 
Note: Mean values displayed as percentages. Observations are at the patent level. 
 
 
Table A3: ISR indices for German firms 
 
F 
index 
FD 
index 
FDS 
index 
Obs. 
2001 63.6 72.9 99.4 7054 
2002 69.1 79.0 106.8 6753 
2003 70.9 94.1 120.1 6194 
2004 69.0 90.0 122.3 6475 
2005 62.5 80.7 111.8 6738 
2006 53.3 72.9 106.8 6952 
2007 52.8 64.6 85.7 7486 
2008 53.5 66.1 84.3 6623 
2009 64.3 72.0 86.4 6601 
Total 61.9 76.6 102.2 60876 
Note: Mean values displayed as percentages. Observations are at the patent level. 
27 
 
Figure A1: PCT patents, national patents and R&D expenditures 
 
Note: R&D expenditures is Gross domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) as defined by 
OECD (2015), measured in million purchasing power parity USD in constant prices of 2010. National 
applications are national patent applications filed by residents. Source: OECD (2016), WIPO (2015a), World 
Bank (2016). 
 
 
Figure A2: R&D expenditures to PCT patents and national patents  
 
Note: R&D expenditures is Gross domestic Expenditure on Research and Development (GERD) as defined by 
OECD (2015), measured in million purchasing power parity USD in constant prices of 2010. National 
applications are national patent applications filed by residents. Source: OECD (2016), WIPO (2015a), World 
Bank (2016). 
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Figure A3: ISR indices by technology area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Mean values for F index, FD index, and FDS index displayed as percentages for the six main technology 
areas (patent counts in parentheses). Observations are at the patent level. 
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